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A B S T R A C T 
 
 
The present paper develops a simple model of a network structure to analyze the 
profitability and the strategic effects of airline alliances in which two complementary 
alliances, following different paths, may be formed to serve a certain city-pair market. 
We examine whether airlines that employ the same hub have an incentive to create an 
alliance, analyze the effects on carriers outside the alliance and study how fares are 
affected. We conclude that complementary alliances are profitable for a sufficient 
degree of product differentiation, which implies that competition intensity is low; that 
an alliance hurts the outsiders; and that fares will decrease. These findings remain valid 
to the introduction of more competition in the form of a direct non-stop flight. Our 
results provide a very simple testable implication that relies on demand parameters that 
measure the degree of product differentiation, and our findings are consistent with some 
of the observed facts in the industry. 
 
Keywords: complementary airline alliances, substitute trips, product differentiation. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The air transportation sector has witnessed a number of changes since the
deregulation processes of the US industry (in the 1980s) and of the Euro-
pean industry (in the 1990s). These changes include the substantial decline
in the number of major carriers, the intensiﬁed reorganization of routes into
hub-and-spoke networks and, still taking place, the formation of strategic
alliances among international carriers.1 The present paper develops a simple
model of a network structure where pas s e n g e r si nag i v e nc i t y - p a i rm a r k e t
use two carriers connecting through a hub airport. Passengers can ﬂyv i a
diﬀerent hubs to reach their destination. We examine whether airlines that
employ the same hub have an incentive to create an alliance, analyze the
eﬀects on carriers outside the alliance and study how fares are aﬀected.
Airline alliances are designed to oﬀer passengers a seamless service in
order to minimize some of the inconveniences of interline multicarrier trips.
They allow the carriers to rely on a partner to provide ﬂight to destinations
where they lack route authority. Cooperation adopts several forms -which
in many instances come close to eﬀective merger- and includes code-sharing
agreements, the coordination of ﬂight schedules and the joint use of frequent
ﬂyer programs. To illustrate our analysis let us consider the following simple
network structure. Suppose that a passenger wishes to travel from Madrid
to Washington. He can ﬂy via Chicago O’Hare International or via Lon-
don Heathrow. In the former case, Madrid-Chicago is provided by Iberia
1See Morrison and Winston (1995) for an overview of developments in the industry.
1(e.g. IB6275) and Chicago-Washington R.Reagan National is operated by
American Airlines (e.g. IB7063). In the latter, the passenger can ﬂyw i t h
British Midland from Madrid to London (e.g. BD482) and then make the trip
between London and Washington Dulles International with United Airlines
(e.g. UA925). As it turns out, Iberia and American Airlines belong to the
Oneworld alliance - in fact, our example is one of a codesharing agreement.
On the other hand, British Midland and United Airlines are partners in the
Star Alliance.2 It is our purpose to characterize the pre-alliance and alliance
situations when there is competition between routes through diﬀerent hubs
and each trip requires travelling with two carriers, which are viewed by pas-
sengers as complementary products.
The existing literature on airline alliances is sparse. Theoretical hub-
and spoke network models include Brueckner and Spiller (1991), Oum et al.
(1995), Park (1997), Berechman et al (1998), Hendricks et al (1999), Barla
and Constantatos (2000), Brueckner (2001), Lin (2004) and Hassin and Shy
(2004). The papers by Oum et al. (1995), Berechman et al (1998), Hen-
dricks et al (1999) and Barla and Constantatos (2000) provide reasons and
conditions under which hub-and-spoke networks are equilibrium structures.
Brueckner and Spiller (1991) ﬁrst developed a hub-and-spoke model where
an airline is considered as a multiproduct ﬁrm with cost complementarities.
They assume a cost function with increasing returns to traﬃcd e n s i t ya n d
2The reader can access www.airwise.com and ﬁnd plenty of examples where a passenger
must change planes on their way to ﬁnal destination where carriers belong to the same
alliance; trips can be made through diﬀerent hubs.
2compare the monopoly solution with other solutions involving various types
of competition. Competition transmits across routes because of returns to
traﬃc density and suggest that antitrust treatment on this issue should be
more carefully looked at. Brueckner (2001) adapts the former model to an in-
ternational setting. His analysis emphasizes the beneﬁcial impact for passen-
gers derived from complementary alliances, since they put a downward pres-
sure on fares in the interline city-pair markets: ”a couple of studies showed
that tickets booked through allied airlines on two-stage ﬂights were 18-28%
cheaper than separate ﬂights on the same route with non-allied airlines”.3
Hassin and Shy (2004) also examine codesharing agreements among airlines
competing on international routes and show that codesharing including all
carriers are welfare improving. On the other hand, Park (1997) classiﬁes
alliances in two categories: parallel and complementary. A parallel alliance
refers to collaboration between two ﬁrms competing on the same route and
the complementary one refers to the case where two ﬁrms link up their ex-
istent networks and build a new network providing an interlining service to
their passengers. Park (1997) shows that each type of alliance has a diﬀerent
impact on economic welfare; complementary alliances are likely to increase
it. Finally, Lin (2004) proposes a game where airlines can choose the roles
of fare-leader and fare-follower in the allied markets.4
3Economist (10/04/2003).
4The eﬀect of airline alliances has been empirically investigated by Oum et al. (1996),
Park and Zhang (1998), Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Brueckner (2003), among many
others. These studies provide evidence that international alliances lead to lower fares,
increases in the number of passengers on the relevant routes and that airline cooperation
3The network structure is typically assumed exogenous and although ear-
lier analyses have looked at several structures, none of them has considered
the one proposed in the present study. It is conveniently constructed to take
into account the type of collaboration among partners in the same alliance,
contemplates the use of diﬀerent hub airports and allows us to model com-
petition between substitute routes when each route is composed of comple-
mentary trips. We will assume that every alliance enjoys antitrust immunity,
which allows the partners to collaborate in pricing decisions. Thus, we will
suppose that cooperation is full, which implies that the alliance will behave
as a single carrier in the market for which it is formed at the eyes of the
passengers.
Speciﬁcally, the aim of our paper is to analyze the proﬁtability and the
strategic eﬀects of airline alliances in a simple setting in which two comple-
mentary alliances, following diﬀerent paths, may be formed to serve a certain
city-pair market. We wish to answer the following questions: when are al-
liances proﬁtable for the potential partners?, what are the ”collateral eﬀects”
of an alliance for the outsiders? what is the outsiders’ optimal response? and
how are fares aﬀected? We conclude that complementary alliances are prof-
itable for a suﬃcient degree of product diﬀerentiation; that an alliance hurts
the outsiders; and that fares will decrease. These ﬁndings remain valid to the
introduction of more competition in the form of a direct non-stop ﬂight. The
generates important beneﬁts for interline passengers. See also Lee (2003) for a criticism
on some evaluations of the US airline industry.
4paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model presenting the
pre-alliance equilibrium and the equilibria arising from the situations with
a single and a double alliance, respectively. A simultaneous game of airline
alliances is then presented. Section 3 proposes a modiﬁcation of the model
where there is a new airline operating. A brief concluding section closes the
paper.
2T h e M o d e l
Basic assumptions.
The model’s network structure is shown in Figure 1. Airline 1 operates
route AH, airline 2 serves route HB, airline 3 provides the ﬂight AK and
airline 4 operates route KB. Travellers wish to ﬂyf r o mc i t yA to city B
through airport H or through airport K. Thus, travellers must ﬂyb ye i t h e r
combining airlines 1 and 2 or by combining airlines 3 and 4 so that routes
AH and HB are regarded as complementary products (just as routes AK
and KB together). However, the trips through airport H and airport K are
viewed by travellers as substitute trips. There is no direct ﬂight connecting
cities A and B so that passengers have to interline at the hubs H and K. The
proposed network structure is meant as a ﬁrst approximation to the above ex-
ample and aims at capturing the particular aspect of alliances where carriers
cooperate to oﬀer trips in which passengers need to travel with two diﬀerent
airlines. Thus, city A w o u l db eM a d r i da n dc i t yB Washington and the hubs
H and K would be Chicago and London, respectively; airlines 1 through 4
5are Iberia, American Airlines, British Midland and United Airlines.5
We will assume that demand functions for air travel between cities A and
B are linear as follows,
Q12 = α − b(p1 + p2)+d(p3 + p4)
Q34 = β − b(p3 + p4)+d(p1 + p2)
where Q12 and Q34 represent the travel volumes on the two interline ﬂights in
the market; pi denotes the fare charged by airline i, for i =1 ,2,3,4; α,β are
positive parameters that measure market size and the quality of the services
provided; b,d a r ep o s i t i v ea n db>d .This demand system for diﬀerentiated
products follows from solving the optimization problem of a representative
passenger with a quasi-linear utility function a la Dixit (1979); it reﬂects
that composite products are substitutes for one another and products are
less diﬀerentiated as d tends to b. Marginal costs per passenger are assumed
zero. Economides and Salop (1992) illustrate their results on complementary
goods with the above linear demand system.
We begin by characterizing the pre-alliance solution. Airlines choose si-
multaneously and non-cooperatively their respective proﬁt-maximizing fares.
The proﬁtf u n c t i o n sa r eπ1 = p1Q12, π2 = p2Q12, π3 = p3Q34, and π4 = p4Q34.
Superscript na denotes the no-alliances scenario. The equilibrium prices are
























































b[(9b2 +4 d2)(α2 + β2)+2 4 bdαβ]
2(9b2 − 4d2)
2
2.1 Alliance equilibrium between airlines 1 and 2.
With an alliance, the airlines 1 and 2 set the fare for ﬂight through hub H
cooperatively while competition with ﬂight through hub K remains. Denote
by p12 the fare of the interline ﬂight. Demand functions take now the form:
Q12 = α−bp12 +d(p3 +p4)a n dQ34 = β −b(p3 +p4)+dp12. Thus, the proﬁt
functions are given by π12 = p12Q12, π3 = p3Q34, and π4 = p4Q34. Solving
the system formed by ∂π12/∂p12 =0 , ∂π3/∂p3 =0a n d∂π4/∂p4 =0y i e l d s













where superscipt a identiﬁes the airline alliance between 1 and 2. The re-







































b[(9b2 + d2)α2 +1 6 bdαβ +4 ( b2 + d2)β2]
8(3b2 − d2)
2
The next result follows directly by comparing the situation with an airline
alliance vis a vis the pre-alliance solution.6
Proposition 1 i) The fare pa
12 is lower than the pre-alliance fare pna
1 +pna
2 .
ii) Airline proﬁts with the alliance are higher than before for 0 <d / b<0.66.
iii) The fares set by airlines 3 and 4 are lower and so are their equilibrium
proﬁts.
The above results partially conﬁrm Cournot’s (1838) model of comple-
mentary duopoly. Cournot considered the merger of two monopolists that
produce complementary goods (zinc and copper) into a single (fused) mo-
nopolist that produces the combination of them (brass). The price of the
composite good is lower than under independent ownership. The alliance
between airlines that oﬀer complementary services internalizes the external-
ity that arises when they set fares independently thus ignoring the eﬀects
on their individual markups. If there were no competition from a substitute
ﬂight, then the alliance would always turn out proﬁtable - as in Cournot’s ex-




12 yields 3b2(3bα +2 dβ)/(54b4 − 42b2d2 +8 d4), which
is clearly positive provided b>d . Since prices are strategic complements it follows that
pa
3 and pa
4 are now lower, and so are proﬁts to airlines 3 and 4 by the way equilibrium
proﬁts are written. Finally, the diﬀerence πa
12/2 −πna
1 yields (b/4)(3bα +2 dβ)2(9b4 −
24b2d2 +8 d4)/(9b2 − 4d2)2(3b2 − d2)2. The sign of the diﬀerence is given by the sign of
9b4 − 24b2d2 +8 d4.T h ed i ﬀerence is positive for (d/b) < 0.66.
8be proﬁtable if competition is not too intense. Values of b far from values of d
imply that product diﬀerentiation is strong and hence competition intensity
is low; the diﬀerence in fares is smaller for smaller values of d. Then, although
prices go down the increase in travel volumes is such that proﬁts under the
alliance situation are higher. Strategic complementary pushes prices of rival
airlines down and consequently their proﬁts.
Our ﬁndings can also be related with the literature on mergers with com-
plementary products. Thus, Gaudet and Salant (1992) consider the case of n
ﬁrms producing perfect complements and competing in price. They suggest
that a merger of a subset s ≤ n of the ﬁrms may be unproﬁtable to the par-
ties. Such a conclusion remains true, as we have just seen, in the presence
of substitute products or systems (two possible trips) where each system is
composed of two complementary components (interline ﬂights).
2.2 Is an alliance between airlines 3 and 4 a best re-
sponse to an alliance between airlines 1 and 2?
This subsection addresses whether it is always strategically optimal for the
airlines outside the alliance to cooperate in setting the fare, p34, for ﬂight
through hub K. Demands are now Q12 = α − bp12 + dp34 and Q34 = β −
bp34 + dp12. Superscripts aa stand for the case where both alliances occur.













































b[(4b2 + d2)(α2 + β2)+8 bdαβ]
2(4b2 − d2)
2
Comparison with the equilibrium variables in the previous subsection
leads to the next result.7
Proposition 2 i) The fare paa
34 is lower than pa
3 + pa
4 when airlines 1 and 2
form an alliance. Furthermore, paa
12 is also lower than pa
12.
ii) Airlines 3 and 4 proﬁts with the alliance are higher than before for 0 <
d/b < 0.77. Furthermore, proﬁts of alliance between 1 and 2 decrease.
Again, the alliance (or integration) of companies providing complemen-
tary products drives prices down. Not only the fare of the new alliance
decreases but also that of the rival; this happens because prices are strategic
complements. It then follows that, as illustrated in proposition 1, the for-
mation of an alliance is disadvantageous for rivals no matter they set fares
cooperatively (as in this subsection) or non-cooperatively (as in the previous
subsection). The intuition for airlines 3 and 4 to strategically form an al-




34 results in b2(2bβ+dα)/(12b4−7b2d2+d4), which is positive
provided b>d .The diﬀerence πaa
34/2−πa
3 yields (b/2)(2bβ+dα)2(2b4−4b2d2+d4)/(4b2−
d2)2(3b2 − d2)2. T h es i g no ft h ed i ﬀerence is given by the sign of 2b4 − 4b2d2 + d4. The
diﬀerence is positive for values of d/b below 0.77.
10of product diﬀerentiation. Consequently, low values of the ratio d/b make
it such that the alliance is proﬁtable despite the loss associated with lower
prices. It is also worth mentioning that a setting with two alliances leads
to lower fares and higher total travel volumes. These theoretical ﬁndings
coincide with some observed facts in the airline industry.
A sf o rc o n s u m e rs u r p l u s ,CSa >C S na unless d/b is very high (above
0.943). Put diﬀerently, when products are very weakly diﬀerentiated an
alliance will damage consumers. It is well known that with homogeneous
products, mergers reduce consumer surplus. The diﬀerence CSaa −CSa has
an ambiguous sign. As expected, the sign depends on the size of the demand
parameters α and β.8 In particular, if the market of the new allied airlines,β,
is suﬃciently large relative to the one of the already allied airlines, α, then
the setting with two alliances will result in higher consumer surplus for every
d/b ∈ (0,1).
2.3 A simultaneous game of airline alliances.
The foregoing analysis suggests that airline alliances are proﬁtable only un-
der some circumstances. Let us then propose the following two-stage game.
In the ﬁrst stage airlines 1 and 2 and airlines 3 and 4 decide simultaneously
and independently whether to form an alliance. In stage two, given the in-
herited outcome from the ﬁrst stage, airlines set fares. From our previous




2(20b5−23b3d2+5bd4). The r.h.s. is increasing with d so
that the higher value it can take is 10/4. Hence, it is suﬃcient that β > 2.5α to have that
consumers are better oﬀ with both alliances.
11analysis the subgame perfect equilibrium amounts to characterizing the Nash
equilibrium of the following normal-form game, where each cell shows proﬁt
per airline:





























We may use the above results to solve for the Nash equilibrium. Suppose
t h a ta i r l i n e s3a n d4d on o tf o r ma na l l i a n c e . T h e n ,a i r l i n e s1a n d2w i l l
if 0 ≤ d
b ≤ 0.66 and will not if 0.66 < d
b < 1. Now suppose that airlines 3
and 4 form an alliance. Then, airlines 1 and 2 will if 0 < d
b ≤ 0.77 and will
not if 0.77 < d
b < 1. The analysis is symmetric to study the best response
for airlines 3 and 4. Thus, the next proposition follows in a straightforward
manner.
Proposition 3 i) No alliances will occur in equilibrium for d
b ∈ (0.77,1).
ii) Both alliances take place in equilibrium for d
b ∈ (0,0.66].
iii) No alliances and both alliances are equilibria for d
b ∈ (0.66,077].
T h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation indicates how intense competition
is in the market. We conclude that a setting with alliances arises when com-
petition intensity is low whereas alliances will not take place in equilibrium
when competition intensity is tough. It must be noted that asymmetric equi-
libria in which only an alliance occurs is not possible in our demand-based
setting. This suggests that some cost structure (e.g. returns to traﬃcd e n s i t y ,
12ﬁxed costs and the like) should be introduced in the model if we searched for
a theoretical explanation to some observed behaviour in the airline indus-
try. Furthermore, part ii) of the above proposition can result in a prisoners’
dilemma situation, that is, πaa
12/2 (resp. πaa
34/2) can be lower than πna
1 (resp.
πna
3 ). It is suﬃcient that d/b exceeds 0.52 to have that πna
1 > πaa
12/2, regardless
of the values of α and β.
3 Direct Non-stop Competition.
We wish to examine whether the previous results are modiﬁed in the pres-
ence of another carrier oﬀering non-stop ﬂights. Thus suppose that there is
another airline, denoted 5, which provides direct service between cities A and
B (see Figure 2). Symmetric demand functions are the following,
Q12 = α − b(p1 + p2)+d(p3 + p4)+ep5
Q34 = β − b(p3 + p4)+d(p1 + p2)+ep5
Q5 = γ − bp5 + e(p1 + p2 + p3 + p4)
where γ > 0, and b>d+ e, because the products are gross substitutes.
We will employ tildes to distinguish the diﬀerent equilibrium variables from
those in the previous section. The pre-alliance equilibrium is characterized
































2e(α + β)+( 3 b − 2d)γ
2(3b2 − 2bd − 2e2)
13˜ Q
na
12 = b˜ p
na
1 ; ˜ Q
na
34 = b˜ p
na
3 ; ˜ Q
na























We next compute the equilibrium when airlines 1 and 2 form an alliance.
Demands now take the form Q12 = α − bp12 + d(p3 + p4)+ep5,Q 34 =
β −b(p3+p4)+dp12+ep5 and Q5 = γ −bp5+e(p12 +p3+p4). Maximization





(6b2 − 2e2)α +( 4 bd +2 e2)β + e(3b +2 d)γ






(2bd + e2)α +( 4 b2 − e2)β + e(2b + d)γ




e(3b +2 d)α + e(4b +2 d)β +2 ( 3 b2 − d2)γ
12b3 − 4bd2 − 7be2 − 4de2
Travel volumes and proﬁts are obtained as above. The next result follows
by comparing the situation with alliance 1 and 2 vis a vis the pre-alliance
solution.9
9It is straightforward to check that the price of ﬂight through hub H decreases, provided
that b>d+e. As for the diﬀerence in proﬁts, we have quadratic terms in the denominator
and a quadratic term in α,β and γ in the numerator. The sign is then given by the sign
of the polynomial in part ii) of the proposition.
14Proposition 4 i) The fare ˜ pa
12 is lower than the pre-alliance fare ˜ pna
1 +˜ pna
2 .
ii) Airline proﬁts with the alliance are higher than before if 18b6 − 48b4d2 +
16b2d4 − 8be2(6b3 +6 b2d − 5bd2 − 4d3)+e4(23b2 +4 0 bd +1 6 d2) > 0.
iii) The fares set by airlines 3,4 and 5 are lower and so are their equilibrium
proﬁts.
It can be observed that the result on fares stated in proposition 1 above
remains true in the presence of an airline oﬀering direct non-stop services.
The diﬀerence ˜ πa
12/2− ˜ πna
1 is positive when the above polynomial in b,d and
e is positive. It will be the case for low and equal values of d and e provided
that b>d+ e. It becomes negative for suﬃciently large values of d and e,
although they are equal, or for high values of d (low e) and low values of e
(high d). It is easy to check that as e → 0, the condition in proposition 1
part ii) is recovered. Hence, the intuition is that the alliance between airlines
1a n d2i sp r o ﬁtable as long as there is enough product diﬀerentiation. Just
note that the fact that there is now more competition in the market because
there is another carrier makes the condition on ”enough” product diﬀerenti-
ation milder.10
We now characterize the equilibrium when both alliances occur to identify
whether airlines 3 and 4 ﬁnd it strategically optimal to cooperate in setting
the fare p34 this meaning there will be three competitors oﬀering ﬂights be-
tween cities A and B. The equilibrium prices are given by,
10For example, take b =1 . The polynomial is positive for d = e =0 .4s ot h a t1> 0.8
and the alliance is proﬁtable. In proposition 1 above, the alliance is proﬁtable for values




























e(α + β)+( 2 b − d)γ
2(2b2 − bd − e2)
Equilibrium travel volumes and proﬁts are obtained as above. We next
present the analogous to proposition 2 above in the presence of competition
from a non-stop carrier.
Proposition 5 i) The fare ˜ paa
34 is lower than ˜ pa
3 +˜ pa
4 when airlines 1 and 2
form an alliance. Furthermore, ˜ paa
12 is also lower than ˜ pa
12.
ii) Airlines 3 and 4 proﬁts with the alliance are lower than before if 8b2(2b4−
4b2d2 + d4)+8 b(b + d)(−5b2 + bd +2 d2)e2 +( 1 7 b2 +2 4 bd +8 d2))e4 > 0.
Furthermore, proﬁts of alliance between 1 and 2 decrease.
iii) The fare ˜ paa
5 is now lower than ˜ pa
5 a n ds oa r ep r o ﬁts to airline 5.
The combination of propositions 4 and 5 imply that we may characterize
t h e( s u b g a m ep e r f e c t )N a s he q u i l i b r i a of the simultaneous game of airline
alliances above presented. As already argued, demand intercepts α,β and γ,
do not play any role in determining a company’s best response. To clarify the
intuition, suppose that b =1 . Then it must be the case that 1 >d+ e. The
polynomial in proposition 4 part ii) is positive for values of d = e between
0a n d0 .434 this meaning that, provided the other two airlines do not form
an alliance, it is a best response to create an alliance between the other two.
The best response is not to form an alliance for d = e between 0.434 and 0.5.
On the other hand, the polynomial in proposition 5 part ii) is positive for
16values of d = e between 0 and 0.472 this meaning that, provided that there
is an alliance, the rivals’ best response is to form an alliance. There are other
combinations of values but the next proposition just collects the cases when
d = e.
Proposition 6 i) No alliances will occur in equilibrium for d = e ∈ (0.472,0.5).
ii) Both alliances take place in equilibrium for d = e ∈ (0,0.434].
iii) No alliances and both alliances are equilibria for d = e ∈ (0.434,0.472].
We conclude that our main result that alliances arise in equilibrium for
suﬃcient product diﬀerentiation holds true, but needs some qualiﬁcation. It
must be noted that alliances will not occur for values of d and e far from
each other. Hence, it suﬃces that competition with one competitor, either
from connecting ﬂights or from direct ﬂights, be strong to make alliances
unproﬁtable. Furthermore, the equilibrium in part ii) above can give rise
to a prisoners’ dilemma situation, that is, the setting without alliances may
yield higher proﬁts than the equilibrium with both alliances.
4 Concluding Remarks.
The airline sector is characterized by its dynamism and transformation over
the last decades. In the 1980s, all major carriers started to organize their
networks in a hub-and-spoke manner and, at the beginning of the 1990s,
a revolution shook the industry: the proliferation of airline alliances. In-
ternational alliances were viewed as the key element for airlines to extend
their networks without investing new resources, being clearly beneﬁcial for
17its members. As a consequence, every major airline in the world belongs
nowadays to one of the three large international alliances (Oneworld, Star
Alliance and Sky Team). There are of course many other features that help
characterize the current and future status of the air transportation landscape
such as the surge of low-cost passenger carriers, the closing of old hubs and
the development of new ones, the expected evolution of regional operators to
join networks, etc. Despite its simplicity, our model identiﬁes the eﬀects of
airline alliances on fares, travel volumes and consumer surplus. Our results
provide a very simple testable implication to establish whether the formation
of an alliance on routes involving several airlines’ ﬂights that are complemen-
tary is proﬁtable. The rule relies on demand parameters that measure the
degree of product diﬀerentiation, and our ﬁndings are consistent with some
of the observed facts in the industry. The interesting results obtained are an
invitation to pursue research along these lines.
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Figure 2. Network structure with direct non-stop competition
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